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Spread -spectrum modulat ion techniques, which are rraditionally applied to military 
systems to enhance their Electronic Counter Counter Measures (ECC M) capabi li ties, are 
heginning to appear in the commercial seclClr. Specifically, spread-spectrum technology 
i., being employed in digital cellular radio systems. These systems are identical to the 
military systems except that they employ much simpler sprr~ding code design and have 
le ss security incorporated. However, d ue to thl.: economies of scale. they can be producp-(I 
at a much h'wer cost than their military counterparts 
The pmmi ng v ulne rJbili ty of such C(lmrnerciai products in tacticlli situation., is 
analyzed in this thesis. The mohile cellular network developed hy Qualcornm lilt. is used 
to illu,trate the methudology in analyz.ing the e ffec ts of jammi ng on tlte mobile cdlular 
network. With a single mobile stat ion and jammer. the probabiliry of Jamming and the 
('primal pm rner rrajeuory are derived. Next, the effective probabilities of detection and 
f<,lo;e aldfm under tile Jamming cundition~ are derived and th(~ mean acquisition times ale 
c,~rnpared to th"t without jamming. Our results show that in telligent jamming can cau.'w 
devastating effects even with very small powl~r. Com mercial proctucts are therefore much 
more vulnerable: due m the simplicity in deSign. 
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I. I NTRODU CTION 
GENERAL 
Spread-spectrum is a modulation tec hnique used for the transmission of digi ta l 
~i gna l ill wh ic h the transmitted signal occupies a band width in excess of the minimum 
necessary to send the information . The spreading of t.he signal i ~ accomplish ed by means 
of a Pseudo-Noise (PN ) Codl~ which is independent of t.he datil. The de;;preading and 
\ub,eljuent data reco\lery M the receiver is accomplished by using a synchronized PN 
Tilere are th ree major types of spread-spectrum sy stems: Direct Sequenc e (OS), 
Frequency "Iopping (I'll ) and Tim e Hopping (TIl) ~'Ystems. Hy brids of these systems have 
also been used. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF SPREAD · SPECTRUM 
Spread -spectrum has a very long am1 interesting history [Ref. I ]. It has been used 
a, a techniq\le for [he Elect!(lnic Counter Counter Measures (ECCM ) in mil itary 
c(lmm unications systems since the mid· I 9S0's. However. there are a few reas.:lIls which 
helped spread-spectrum gain popularity in commercial comm unications 
First!y. with the imm inent endi ng of the cold-war, the U.S. Government has 
decreased Department of Defence spending. This has aflectcd the re.l.earch and 
11eveh 'pment Jnd manu!anuri ng of spread-spectrum product,. Therefo re. r~ s~ arc hers and 
man uf<l cture r ~ of spread-spec tru m products have stan~d lOOking fo r altemate uxs of 
spread spectrum pr0duct~ . 
Secondly. spread-spectrum techniques all ow different users to share the already 
over crowde,d and limited rad io spectrum. Spre<ld-spectflnn techniques by themselves 
pwvide vcry inefficient usage of the, bandwidth because of the spreading process. 
However, the spreading allows different users to overlay the ex. isting radio spectrum and 
therefure make efficient spearum Us.lge . It abu allows the sharing oJ chan nets in the 
digital mobile cellular radio system which increases system capacity when compared til 
an 3nalr'g ~)'stem. 
Last. but [1(1\ least, in 1983 Federal Communications Cummission (FCC) upcn~ll 
the Indust riaL Scientific, and Medical (lS\:I) frcquency band for unlicensed operat ion of 
devi(·cs under FCC technical rcgulations 15.247. This permits spreacl-spectrum modulation 
at a ma,imum rransmittcr powcr of 1 W in three bands 902 to 928 MHz, 2400 tu 
24H3.5 MHz, and 5725 to 5850 MHz. This, of cou rse, allowcd JIIany small husiness 
ventures to start manufacturi ng and selling spread-spectrum products without obtaining 
licensing from FCC. 
The ISM band has since been congested with thousands of spread-spectrum users 
The FCC has in response opened oth~r frequency bands for spread-spectrum users. From 
t llen (In. sp read-spectru m systems have found their way in many commcrcial systems such 
<.1, ~·I()bile Cellular Communications Systems, Personal Communications Network (PCN), 
GILlb~1 Positioning System (GPS), Wireless Local Area Nctworks (WLA:"l) ~nd many 
COMI\·lERCI,\L SPREAD-SPECTRUM AI'PUCATlONS 
Personat Communic.ations "'I('lwork 
A PCN is a type of Personal Commu nications Services (PCS) that uses a cellular 
system which operates with cells placed about 1000 ft apart. The FCC has granted 
experimental license to a few spread-specu·um manufacturers to conduct fie ld trial s ami 
studies in th~ 1850 to 1990 MHz band. This b<lnd is sparsely used for microwave 
transmission. Therefore, the idea is for the Code Division Multiple Access (CD\1A) PCN 
.... ystem to share the same frequency band with existing microwave users and thereby 
in(fease the utilizati(ln efficiency of the frequency bane!. 
The results of the field trials conducted by PCN America, Inc. in Houston , Tex<ls 
and Orlando, Florida for 2 ycars have shown that the PCN spread-specrrum system can 
cll-nist with those point-to-p(lint mh:rowave facilities operating at 1:-;50 w 199(J MHz as 
I(>ng as the PCN ,)'stcms are operating at data rares of T-I (1.544 Mbp.~) (lr less. [Ref. 
2) In th~ ncar future, there will very hkeIy he PCl\' users shari ng the same freq ueru:y band 
wi th miLT()wavt~ users. 
1. Glohal Positioning System 
GPS, one of the mili tary application of sprea(Hpcctrum has ~ince been made 
availah le for commercilll usage. The GPS enables use rs to dererminc their pOsi tion on or 
above the earth' s surface ((1 an accuracy of within 10 10 20 m by measuring their fllnge 
\(> four GPS satellites whose position is accurately known. [Ref. 31 
J. Wireless Local Area Network 
Another very sizable mllrket for commercial spread-spectru m I.lsage is in WLM. 
There are presently many manu facturers of WLA.J~. however. nOi all of them use spreall-
spcctrum tec hnologies. One e);amplr of spread-spectrum WLAl\ is the Multipoint AilJink 
(jeve loped by Cylink. It lIseS the ISM band 902 to 928 MHz and therefore no li (cnSing 
is re'--lu ired. It allows data speeds from 1.2 to 64 kbps for sync hronous transmiss i(ln and 
lip to 1'1.2 kbps for asynchronous transmi~~i(ln. [Ref. 4] 
4. Other Applications 
Other spread-spectrum users incll.lde Western Mullipla Corp.'s TI digital 
micwwave radio known as Lyn); Rlldio . It u<;c, direct sequence spread- spectrum coding 
w transport a f ull T ] digital signal. Lynx operate~ III 1 W under the ISM frequency band 
[Re f. 51 
O lher pre~nt and fulUre spre lld-spectrum applications include automated data 
collcnion , wireless Private Brallch Exchange (PBX), wireless Integraled Services Digital 
Network (ISDN), digital stereo and a host of othe r applications. 
D. OUTLINE 
This thesis will study the effects of an intelligent jammer on a mobile cellu lar 
network similar to the onc developed by Qualcomm Inc. In the neht chapter, a brief 
introduction to th"" QuaJcomm's ~)'st""m will bc provided. The details can be foum1 in (he 
proposed wid ""band spread -sp""crrum stand<lrds developed by Qualcomm [Ref. 6J 
In chapter Ill, the ~)'stem model will be developed and the probability of jamming 
a mobile station in the cell will be derived. The optimal trajectory for th e Jammer is also 
derived. Chapter IV compares the performance of the mobile station with and witlwut the 
jammer. [n particular. the effective probability of detection, effective probability of false 
alarm and tIle mean acquisi tion time are derived. fi nally, the concluding chapter provides 
a summary of the thesis and recommendat ions for further research 
II . THE QlJ ALCQ,\iM DIGITAL MOBn"E CELLCL AR RADIO SYST EM 
Q ualcomm developed a proto type CDM A digital cel lular sy stem in Nov R9 and 
carried out extensi ve technical field tria l in Feb 90. The Qua1comm system uses a 
transmission bandwidth of 10 MHz which is subdivided into rougil ly 8 wideband CDMA 
channels of 1.23 MHz eac ll . The first COMA channel occupies the band from 869.4 15 
MH7, to 870.645 ,M,Hz for tile forward link (from base STation to mobile station), with a 
center freq uency of H70,030 MH z. The correspond ing channe l for the reverse link (from 
mubile station \(> base station) occupies the hand fro m 824.41 5 MHz to 825.645 MHz, 
with a cente r frequency of 825.030 \II,Hz. The reverse: link is always 45 MHz below that 
of the fo rwan\ link. All forward transmissions in a CDM A cellular system share the same 
bandwidth. however, all reverse transmissions share a different frequency band of 1.23 
MH z 
R. REVER SE CDM A CHAN NF.T 
The block diagram for the reverse CDMA channel is shown in Figure 2. !. The 
in put data rate can have val ues from 1.2 khps to 9.6 kbps. The data is convolutional 
encoded with a code rate of 113 and a constrai nt length of 9 for error de tection and 
cOfTl:ction, The convolutional encoder used is shown in Figure 2.2. Por each input bit to 
the convolutional encoder. three code ,ymbols co. c p c, are generated at tile output 
Therefore . a 9.6 kbps data resul ts in an output of 3x9.6 kbps or 28.8 bps. As for dat:1 
rates less than 9.6 kbps, the ou tput will be repeated until the output is at a constant 
symbol rate of 2&.H bps, i.e., a 2.4 kbps input will be repeated 3 times (each ~ymbol 
occurs 4 times) 
Figure 1.1 Transmitrer f(lf the reverse COMA channel [Ref. 7J. 
L-______________ ~ 
Figure 2.2 Convolutional encoder for reverse COMA channel [Ref. 7]. 
The convolutional en coder is followed by lhe block interleaver. The purpose of 
in te rleaving is to disperse the effect of bursty channel errors since convolutional codes arc 
effective in correcting lion-bursty random channel errors. The encoded information is 
grouped into G ~mb()1 groups (or code words). These code words are used to selecl one 
of the 64 different orthogonal Walsh symbols or Hadamard codewords fo r transmission 
Each Wa lsh symbol is a row of the Hadamard matrix The Hadamard matrix H,~, where 
In IS a power of 2, is generated by the matrix in an 
(21) 
wllh initial condition 
°1. (22) 
1 
The Hadamard codewords afC orthogonal rhat IS, the dot product of any two 
codeword IS zero when lhe code bit 0 is transformed to 1 and the code bit 1 is 
transfo rrTH:d to -I. Since thes~ !.:oUewords are orthogonal, they !.:an be uniquely 
deolOdlllated at the base station 
The orthogonal modulator output is spread by a long PN sequem:e with a period 
of 2" - I, The long I'N sequence is a m-sequence with 42 shift regls leJS All mohile 
stations in the CDMA system will use Ihis same long PK sequence with a ulllque phas~ 
offset The long PN sequence has a chip rate of 1,2288 Mcps Since the \Valsh !.:hip rate 
IS 307,2 kcps, each Walsh chip is spread by 4 long PN sequcnce chips 
The outgoing PN spread signal is further spread by 2 short PN sequences They 
a re the In-phase (I) and Ouadraturc-phase (0) pilot PN sequences. They are called pilot 
PN sequences because the base station uses them to broadcast a quadriphase PN spread 
pilot synchroniwtion signal. All transmissions m the CDl\.lA system, either from mob ile 
stations or base stations, share the same pair of pilot sequences_ DIfferent cells uses a 
different phase offset fo r the pilot PK codes, and all the transmissions v.;thin the same 
cell bave the same pilot PN code phase offset Signals from different cells are therefore 
distinguishable. 
These short PN sequences are generated from m-sequences with period equal !(l 
2" · ] - 12,767. H(lwcver. for each perioo of the m-sequence, a a is inserted after a n m 
(If J4 a's, Ihis increases the I and Q seque nces 10 a period of 32,768. The total number 
of available phases, L is therefore 32,768. The time clock of the I and Q pilot PN 
sequence ge nerators arc at 1.2288 MHL, which is same as the long PN sequence time 
The time period of the pilot PN sequence is equal to 32,768/ 1.2288 = 26.667 illS 
<lna therefore there are exactly 75 pilot PN sequence repetitions every 2 seconds. 
After the long and short sequence spreading, the quadrature channel undergoes ~ 
del;ty of half a PN chip. Thi s quadripha.'>C spreading is called Offset Quadrature Phase 
shift keying (OQPSK) . The OQPSK has the advantage of less abrupI phase changes and 
hence less d istortion when amplified as compared to the QI'SK. The I and Q channels are 
then handlim ilea 10 0.615 MHz hy digital Finite Im pulse Response (FIR ) filters. The 
haseband signals are then modulated ont(l quadrature carriers, summed. ampl.ified and then 
transmitted 
In ~um m ary, the reverse channel uses a 64 orthogonal data modu lation with 
OQPSK PN spreading. The receiver at lhe base station attains frame and chip 
sync hronizalion with lhe mobile station. However. the carrier phase is not syncmoni7.ed 
and the demodu lation at the base station is by non-coherent orthogonal demodulation. 
The phase offset of the long PN sequence gives a unique address to eac h mohile statinn 
whi le the short I and Q I'N sequence gives a unique address t(I each ce jl 
c. FonWAIW CDMA CHANNEL 
The block diagram for the forward CDMA channel is shown in Fig ure 2.3 . II 
comprises 64 code channels that are transmitted on a single 1.23 MHz forward CD,\1A 
handwidth. The information goes through a convolutional encoder as shown in Figure 2.4 
with a r;t le of 1/2 and constraint le ngth 9. It is repeated just as in the case of the reverse 
c]l4nnej if the datll rate L, less than 9.6 kbps. After eocooi ng. it is bloc k interleaved. 
biphase spread by the long rN sequence wi th a unitjue phase offset, hiphase modulated 
by a WJJsh function (whic h has 6d Waish chips), quadriphase spread by the ! and Q short 
pilut PN se4uences. After that lhe quadrature channels are fillered and modulated OlitO 
4uadrature channels and then lfansmitted. 
Figu re 2.3 Transmitter for forward CDMA channellRef. 71 · 
Figure 2.4 Cunvolutional tm;oder for forward CDMA channel [Ref. 7J 
The spreading by the long PN sequence is a scrambling operation that provides 
data privacy for tht mobile station. The 64 (;OOt (;hannels are each specified by a Walsh 
fun(;tion. The orthogonality among the 64 Walsh function provides nearly perfect isolation 
between the multiple signals transmitted by the base station, and these multiplexed signals 
Me distinguishable at the mobile stations 
An important a'ipect ["If the forwan1 link is the use of the pilot signal that is 
tun~;:nitttd by each base ~tati(ln and is used as II coherent carrier referen(;e for 
demodulation by all the mobile stations. The pilot is transmitted at a relatively hightr 
level than other types of signals allowing extremely accurate tracking. The pilot channel 
signal is unmodulated by information and uses the zero Walsh function (which comprises 
64 O's). Thus, the signal simply consists of the quadrature p,tir of PK codes. The mobile 
statiun can obtain synchroniz.ation with the nearest base station by searching out the entire 
length of the PN code. The strongest signal's time offset corresponds to time offset of the 
nearest base station's PN code. After synchronization. the pilot signal is used as a coherent 
carrier phase reference for demodulation of the other signals from this base statiun. 
In the reverse CDMA channel, we have seen that the 64 Walsh functions are used 
to pwvide orthogonal data modulation, However, in the forward channel, the same Walsh 
10 
functions are used to provide orthogonal covering of 64 cod~ channels. The selection of 
the Walsh function, is detlJrmined by the mobile station's assigned code channel 
In summary, the forward channel uses coherent erSK modulation With QrSK PN 
spreading, It transmits 64 orthogonal code channtlls In a frequency bandWidth of 1.2} 
MJ lz. Th e phase offsets in th e short I and Q PN sequences \.\111 prOVide the identity of 
the base station. Thtl phase offsets in the long l'N code provides the identity of the mobile 
station The pilot channel allows a mobile station to acquire th lJ timing of the forward 
CDMA channels. provi des a phase refeTlJnce for coherent demodulation, and provides a 
referenclJ for signal strength compansons between base stallons for determining when to 
hand-off 
0 , PROCESSING GAL'\' OF THE SYSTEM 
rhe processing gain of spread-spectrum !»'stem is an important performance 
pa l<1 mete r smce it IS a measure of how well the system call suppress interfering Signals 
It IS commonly know as the spreading factor and is defined as 
PG= Chip rate 
Data rate (2,]) 
For the Qualcomm COMA system, the chip rate, Re IS 1.2288 MIL,: and the data 
rate, Rb varies from ] ,2 kbps 10 9.6 kbps. Therefore, the processing gain varies from 128 
(21 dB) 10 1024 (]O dB) depending on the data rate 
E. CAPACITY OF TIlE CDMA SYSTEM 
In CDhIA, frequency reuse efficiency is determined by the signal-to-interference 
ratio resulung frolll all the system users ....,jthin range, not Just those in any given cell 
Since the total capacity becomes quite large, the statistics of the users are what IS 
Illlpo rtant, not ally singl e user. This meaJlS that the nel in terference to any given signal 
is simply the average of all the users' received power times the number of users. As long 
as the ratio of the received signal power to the average noise power density is greater than 
a threshold value then the channel will provide an acceptable signal quality 
The primary parameters that determine the CDMA digital cellular system capacity 
are processing gain, th e E/N 0 (with the required margin for fad ing), the vuice duty cycle, 
the CDMA omni-directional freq uency reuse efficiency, and the number of sectors in the 
cell-site anknna. The complete equation for determination of capacity in Qualcomm's 





,',' = Calls per cell (Assuming Rayleigh Fading reverse link) 
It" = Spread bandwidth (Assuming 1,2288 MHz) 
9.6 kbps) 
= Bit power spectral density (Assuming 6,0 dB) 
duty (Assuming 50%) 
F = Frequency reuse effici ency (Assuming 60%) 
G '" Number of sectors in cell (Assuming 3 sectors) 
(24) 
Using the above equation with the assumed values of the parameters. we see that 
the CDMA system can support about 116 channels 
F. POWER CONTROL lI"o' CDMA 
Tn CDMA mobile cellular systems, It is very important to control the power of 
each mobile station such that the power received at the base stanon is nominal. If the 
received power is below nominal, then the bit error rate would increase and performance 
degrades. However, if the received signal power of a mobile station is above nominal, 
then the performance of that mobile station will be good but other mobi le stations will 
suffer interfen:nce and their perfonnance will degrade 
The Qua1comm reverse link power control uses both an open loop control as \vell 
12 
as a closed loop control. In the open loop control, Ihe mobile slatil'll estimates its 
minimum transmit power n~quircd to [(-aeh the base station based on the measurement of 
th(~ n~ceived power of the pi lot signal trom rtw base stat iQIl . However, since the forward 
JJ\l1 re ,, ("rse link freque ncies are separated by 45 MHl, the fading c;.;pcrieoced by these 
[Wl' links are independent, the open loop colltrol is not ideal. Therefore, OIl top of the 
open loop control, the mobile station also uses a dosed loop control. In closed loop 
comrol, the base station measures the received signal strength from the mobile station and 
compares it to the desired signal strength and sends OUi power adjustment commands to 
the mobile station. This power adjustment command is combined with the mobile station's 
('pen loop estimate tc1 obtain the final value of the mobiJe station's transmit power 
rhe forward link also employs a power control. 1n this case the base station 
JdJU,b it~ transmit power based on rel/ubl.> from mobile stations . The adjustment would 
u,ually be small and the base station must also consider the power oemand s bf':ing made 
on it by aJl the mobile stJtions in deciding whether to comply with the rel/ueS! of any 
particu lar mobile station 
13 

Tll. SYSTF.l\.l MODEL AND PROBABILITY OF .IAMJ\.lING 
In th Is chapter, we shall study the effect ofaJammer stationed wlthm a single cell 
with one mobile .,ration We wi ll der ive the probability of jamming for the mobile statIon 
as a function of tho ratio of the Effective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) of the jammer 
and the base station as well as the relat ive dIstances between the base station. Jammer and 
mobile statIon 
A. SYSTEM MODEL 
Consider a Single mobile station M . which can be umformly distributed in a cell 
of normal ized radius and with a base station n at the center The base station has an 
antenna gaIn Go, and a tran smit power PR while the mobile statIOn has 1Il1 antenna gain 
of Now consider an intelligent Jammer which knows the I, Q sequences and the,r 
~xact phases used by the base station for this cell The Jamrn~r transmits a s ignal at a 
power of p) and a gain of Cj with a different phase as the base station so as to confuse 
the mobile station One possible dIsposition of the base station, 1110blle station and Jamme r 
IS shown in FI gure 3_1 
The received power at the mobile station from tho base station p~~ is given by 
(3.1) 
where A IS the wavelength of th e transmitted signal from base station to mobile stallon 
and d BM IS the distance from the base station to the mobil e station 
Tho;: received power at the mobil e station from the j ammer PN tS similarly given 
by 
(3.2) 
where d.-" IS the distance fro m the Jammer to the mobile station 
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Figure 3 J One possible disposition of the base station, mobile station and jammer 
From Figure ) ,] and using cosine rulc, we can express d,ll.l as 
(33) 
where d, IS the distance from th e base station to the Jammer and eM and 9,1 arc tht" angles 
as shown in Figure 3 1 
Fo r jamming to be effective, that is when the mobile station IOl:ks-on to the 
Jamming signal instead of the base station's signal, the received power from the Jammel 
must be greater than the received power from the base station at the mobi le station 
When th e two received powers are equal, we get 
By slmpllfylllg and defining 
we can get 
For simplicity of discussion we assume aJ = aM' and we get, 
r 2-2r+l-P, "' O , 









The twO locations of the mobi le station where tbe power received from the base 
station and jammer are equal are as shoWJl in Figure 3.2. By solving equation 3.7 for 
different values of a .... , we can trace the loci of the points where the mobi le stallon will 
receive equal power from the base station and Jammer The loci is a circle with center C 
and radlusR where 
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R = dBJ (l~<) , 
"" (].JR) 
F igure 3.2 The locatIOns wi1hin the cell where 1he mobile station is jammed 
(3, 1 ' ) 
(3, 12) 
If the mobile station is on th e circumference of this jamming circle, it receives 
equal power from the jammer as well as the base station. If the mob il e station is wi thm 
the shaded area of the jamming circle, it receives greater power from the Jammer than the 
base station and is Jammed, If the mobile station is withi n the unshaded area of the cell, 
,t receIves greater power frum th e base station than the Jam mer and is not jammed 
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H. l'IWBABU.nV OF' JA MI\.UNG 
fil e prohabil ity "t the mllbile station be ing pmmed is the ratio of the shaded ~ rea 
ti' the tot.iJ area ( I f the cell and i~ a fUllC [i(l rl of P, and rhe locatlUn of the Jammer. T he 
h ,ei\ti on of the pm mer which gives the ma;r;imum probability of Jamming is k.m1wn a~ the 
uptimum Jammer location d./ . So tar, we have assu med that the Jammer is stationary and 
the mobile station is uniform ly distributed in the cell. However, in real ity, the mobile 
stalion is not uniformly d istr ibuted anel therefore, the jammer has to move to ac hieve the 
same probability of jamming. Since we have already found the optimum Jammer il,cation 
when the jammer is stationary, the opt imal j ammer trajectory is simply the lu<.:i of pClinrs 
Jui ning lile (lp timum Jammer /ocati(m when OJ \laries f[[lm 0 to 360". Thi , is simply a 
cin;l~ wjl li tlie ba,e station as the origin and (he optim uill Jammer location as The radill'. 
Tile (opt im um jamm er location is shown jn fj g\lre 3.3 for different \lalues of 1', 
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Figure 3.3 shows that when P, (the ER r rat io of Jammer to base station) is very 
~m~ll. the optimum jammer location dsJ" is far from the base station. When P, iJll.;Tease~, 
the optimum jammer location moves closer to the base station until when P, is almost 
unity. In the limit, when P, '" 0, the jammer is at the circumference of the cell and when 
P, '" I, the jammer is at the base station. 
It i~ also interesting to study the variations on the center C and the radius R of 
tho:- jamming drcle to P,. Th o:- center and the radius are functions of the IOl.:ation (If the 
jammer. Note however, the center of the jamming c ircle is not the same as the optimum 
jammer location as shown in Figure 3.2. If we assume the jammer location is optimum, 
the varia tions of C and R are plotted in Figure 3.4 and 3.5 respecti vely. 
'0 
Plot ot c9nter ot optimum Jamming clfe le VS Pt 
0.5 
~ 
Figure 3.4 Center of optimum jamming circle for different P,. 
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Figure :1.:: Radill <; of optimum Jamming circle for oifferent l' 
Fr(\m Figure 1.4. it is seen that when P, is small. the cerllr.r uf the j<l.mming l irc1 e 
I., almust eljllal to unity and from Figure 3.5, the radius i s almost zero. (i .e .. the re is nl) 
jammi ng at al l). This means that a jammer with sm all power and omni directiunal 
antenna has a wry small proballility of jamming a mobile stati on in th(~ !.:ell . However, 
when P, is almost unity . the center and rild ius of the Jamming circle tend s to infinity 
the Jamm ing circle is half the cell;'. Although the jamming cirde is (lnly half of the ce ll, 
the interpretation is that a mobile station within the cell has 0.5 prohahility of being 
iammed 
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Figures 3_3 to 3.5 shows that. it is advantageous for a jammer with omnidirectional 
ant.enna to move dostr to the base st.ation when its power increases. The radius of 
Jamming rirrlt also increases as t.hr Jamnwr moves closer to the base stiltion. rigure 3.0 
shows graphically the jamming circles tor different P, whtn the jammer is at the optimum 
l(x:~tjon 
Figure Jamming cLrrles with different f' 
The maximum probability of jamming for different values of P, is obtained with 






Plmolma1'mumprobabil "v al lamm'ngvsPt 
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" 
Figu re 3.7 Maximum probability o f Jamming for different P,. 
It can be seen that when 1', is small, the probability of Jamming is small. As P, 
increases. the probability ofjarnming also increases. WhenP, is unity, the probability nf 
Jamming is 0.5. This is because the mobile station receives equal power from the jammer 
and the base station and there is an equal chance that the mobile station will lock-on to 
ei ther the base station or the jammer. However, when P, is slightly greater than unity, the 
probability of jamming is unity since the mo bile station will Jock-on t(l the jammer 
instead of the base statio n. Therefore, there is a discontin uity in the probability of 
Jamming when P, is equal to unity. 
From (3.1 0), when P, is greater than unity, the locations within the cell where the 
mobile station is jammed is shOw n in Figure 3.8. 
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"" (1.....'1\) 
Fig ure 3.H Jammi ng area fo r P, greater than unity. 
From (3 .1 J) and (3 .1 2). it can be seen that when d~J is small. i.e " the Jam mer 
j , du~e to the base stat ion, the center, C and radius, R of the JamTlling c ircle is also 
sm all . In the li mit when d~J is zero, i.e ., the jammer is at the base station, the entire cell 
is jammed since C and R are both zero. Therefore. the optimal jamming distance, dB/ f[u 
P, greater than unily is always at the base station and this gives a probability of jamming 
of un ity 
24 
IV. PERI'ORMA J'IICE ANALYSIS 
In this chapter. we shall fiIst derive the mean probability of detection and false 
alarm under no jamming based on noncoherent serial aC4uisition [Ref. 7J and then find 
the ttlreshold that minimizes the mean aC4uisition time. Then by u~,ing this threshold, we 
shall derive the effective probability of delection and false alarm for the single user cell 
and singl e jammer. We shall also the find the deteriorat ion in the mean acCjuisilion time 
with a jammer with different power 
SYSTEM M01>EL 
The block diagram for a noncoherent serial scheme is as shown in Figure 4. 1. In 
a serial aCljuisition scheme, the uncertainty phases are inspected one at a time, in a serial 
manner, until an aligned phase is found 
r{~f:')d'L')' I -- m ~ (tl co~ (ootl 
'i , " , 1"~~s-
I ". ,"oomo. I \JPd.<Lt" ph& ... C 
Figure 4.1 Block dIagram of nOllcohcrent senal acqUlSltlOn scheme. 
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r he mput to the receiver r(t) comprises the base station's signal of power P"a, 
add ilive whllC Gaussian noise with two-sided power spectral density of N /2 and Jammer 
signal wi th power /'. ,1 Assuming that the jamming sign al is wideband and centered around 
the center frequency of th e base station, we model the jamming signal as white Gaussian 
nOise with a one-sided power spectral density of N/=PRJ.i2 where P RJ is the received 
power from the Jammer and T, is th e bit pe riod 






PEW is the received power fro m the base station, T' is the intClgration time, K IS the 
th reshold and 111 SO.5 represents the misalignment of the incomlllg phase and the 
reference phase 
The probahillty of false alarm is given by 
p[lJ '" ~ 2~2e -U/2Q ' dlJ '" C - Kj20 ' , (4.4) 
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS WffH NO .lA I\L\1rNG 
Probability of Detl."c.tion and False Alarm 
In order to calculate the probability of detection and probability of fa lse alarm, we 
need to know th ~ threshold, K In th e receiver of the mobi le stmion. We shall first 
examine the case without the Jamming signal and determine the minimum mean 
acquIsItIon lime 
As we have found in the previous chapter, th e power received from th e base 
station by th e mobile station depends on the location of the mobi le station. Representin g 
the location of the mobile station in cartesean coordinates (x, y), the power receiv ed fro m 
the base station can be represented as 
(4 .5) 
As an example let us assu me that the base stat ion and the mobil e station have 
the follow ing parameters 
Powe, of base station, Pb' = I W 
Gain of base station's antenna, G8 ~ 0 dO 
Gain of mobile station's an tenna, GM =; 0 dB 
Wavelength , A =- 0.31 m (Frequency,! = 870 MHz) 
Chip period, Tc -,. 1/]2288 I-I S = 0,8 138 I-I s 
Bit period, To = 1/9600 s = 104.1 671-1s 
Ont:-sided noise power spt:c tra l denSIty N o == 4 x 10 " WIHz 
Integration tIme r ~ 1/9600 S = 104 167 I-Is 
Misalignment. y = 0.5 r , 
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rhe probability of lletection, Po and probability of false alarm, Pio f~lr each m"oile 
ioc ati"n lx, y ) are calculated using (4.1) to 14.5) e.~ccpr that in (4,3) . .'oi, == I) 
sil1<.;e we assume lhe absence of the jamming signal, In this case , 0" is calculated III be 
3.2e-13. A mesh plor for the probability ot" detection and probability of false alarm with 
a threshold of K=le-20 is shown in Figure 4.2 and 4.3 re~llectively 
Probability of d9t~C1ion tor Kml 8·20 • (J " 3.2e-13 
Figure 4.2 Plot of probability of detection with no jamming. 
In Figure 4.2, we have divided half the cell with radius 5000 m into ROO points 
wah the x axis from -5000 to 5000 and y axi5 from 0 to 5000. The probability of 
L1etection is calculated for each point. The lower half of the cell is symmetrical since we 
have assumed that the jammer is located along the x axis. Figure 4.2 shuws that the 
pn,bability of detection is almost unity within the entire ceil 
P'obaol l ~y ojjaI5" alarm for K. l .. -20 . cr '" ).2". 13 
Figure 43 Plm of probability of fa lse alarm with no jamming. 
Figure 43 sh ows that the probabili ty of false alarm is nearly zero within the 
emin: <..:ell for a thresh old of le· l O. Therefore, the threshold of le·lO, gives a hig h 
probab ility of detection and low probability of false alarm. We shall con firm that this is 
tnueed a good threshold by obtaining the threshold thai minimizes the mean il<..:l.\uisllW n 
Befo re we find the mean aLl.\uisitiofl time. we nei::d to define the mean probability 
( If dele<..:tiun ;.[nL! false alarm as the sum of aJl the probabilities of detection and ial se 
alarm at all points within the cell divided by the number of points respeo.:tively. 
The mean probabilities of de tection and false alarm are plOtted versus different 
thresh olds in Figure 4.4 and 4.5 re~l'ectively . 
19 
Plot ot Probabi l ~y at O .. tBction vs Threshold 
Figure 4.4 Plot of mean probability of detection for different thr~shol ds 
Figure 4.4 shows that th~ mean probability of detection decreases when the 
threshold increa&s. This is by no means a surprise, since we know from (4,1) that the 
probabil ity of detenion is simply the portion of the area under the probability density 
function (pdf) where II is greater than the threshold K. The pdf appHladies a norma) 
distributiun since the variance c:i' is very small in this case. The purtion of lhe area under 
ttl l' pdf gets smaller as K is increased 
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Pint r.f Probability cf Fals", Alalm vs Thr .. sho ld 
Figllre 4.5 Plot of mean probabili ty (If fal se alarm for different thresh olds 
Figure 4.5 sh(lw s that the probability of false alarm is near ly zero for all values 
except fo r very small values dose to the noi se power, d . From (4.4 ). wc notice thm the 
pwbabili ty of false alarm is i ndependcnt of the si gn al and i s sole ly depcndcnt on the noise 
power. In thi, case, the noise power is "cry sm all, t.hc refore, the pWDahility of fals.e al<lfm 
i., nearly zero. Of course for vallles of K much smaller than 0 ', tht'" prohahi li Ly (,f fals t'" 
alarm is IlO longer neglig ible 
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2. 1\-1e:111 Acquisition Tim~ 
From [Ref. 7], the mean acquisition time T "'0 is related to P", and PI' as in (4.6). 
where L is the !Otal number of different phases in the I, Q PN s.cqurnce and Te is the 
pe nalty time incurred for each false alarm. 
The mean acquisition time is the parameter that we shall strive \(l minimize. This 
can be done by vary ing the threshold and the integration time. By assuming an integratiun 
timr, T" of Tv , and using a penalty time of 10 x Tv and L "'" 32761;, we can plot the mean 




We can see [mm Figure 4.6 that the threshold which gives the minimum mean 
acquisitiun time lies between 0 and le- 19. By enlarging the plot in the region uf inwresl 
a., shown in I'igure 4.7, we see that the threshold is around l~-20 . This gives a ml~an 
;j(:qu isi tiun time of 1.7 s which is very near 10 the value givr.n in [Ref. 6J. Accord ing to 
IRef. 6], the meall acqui<;ition time should bl~ kss thall 2 s 
Plot of mean acqlJisrt,anl,mevsthrBshoid 
'c~----~-----7----~C'-----~----~ 
Figure 4.7 En larged plut uf mean acquisition time for different threshulds with "f,,- IOT u. 
\Ve shall now use Ihe threshold of le-20 for the analysis in the performance under 
J'lmmmg. 
C. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS WITH JAMMING 
For the case of a mobile station in a cell with a jammer as shown in figure 4.!L 
thG mobile station can be either within the jamming circle (in shaded region ) or outside 




FIgure 4.!l Mobile sta1l0n In a cell wIth a JammeJ. 
Mobile jammed 
With the assumption of an in te lligent jammer that transmits the same hamlwidth 
as the base station's signal, wjth the same PN sequence but at a different phase , the 
mobile station will lock-on 10 the jammer jf it"s inside the jamming circle, and lock-nn 
to the base station if it's outside the jamming circle. 
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Effecti ve Pll)babilit~, of Detection and False Alann 
The effective probability of detection. Pd. 'iT is derived us ing the tota l p robabili ty 
Since the probability of detection when the mobile station is with in the Jamming circle 
IS 0, the effective probability of detection is sim ply the product of the probability of the 
mobi le station not being jammed and the conditional probability of detect ion given that 
the mobJle station I ~ not Jammed as given by 
Pd , ~U = Pr(jarr,med)XPd{jalr.med) + Pr (]am.71ed) xPd {]a!ll.71ea) 
= Pr (ja. Il17!ed ) xO + PI (.7anImed) XPd{]amnJcd) 
= PrC7a.mmedlxPd (]anl.7Jcal . 
(47) 
l he effective probabil ity of false alarm , Pf~,[f can also be derivt"d using the IOta I 
probabi lity The probabi lity of false alarm given that the mobi le station IS not jammed is 
simply calculated by (4.4) The probability of false alarm given that the mobi le station IS 
Jammed is the sum of the probabili ty of detecting the ph ase of the jamming signal and 
the probabi li ty of detecting a phase which belongs to neither the base station nor the 
Jammer The latter probabi li ty is Just the probability of fa lse al arm for the jamming ~i gnal 
mu ltiplied by the fac tor (L-2)!(L -j ). Smce l. is usually large, this factor approximates to 
olle The probabtl ity of false alarm on the Jamming sign al when the mobile station is 
Jammed is usually very small and the p robability of detec ll ng the Jamming Signal when 
the mobi le slation is Jammed is usuall y very near unity . Therefore. to simp l!fy the 
analysis. we assume that the Slim of the probability of detection and probability of the 
fa lse alarm on the Jamming signal IS approximately one, then ~("ff approximates to the 
product of the probabili ty o f the mobil e station not bei ng jammed and probabil ity of false 
alarm g iven that the mobi le stat ion is not jammed pillS th e probability that the ITIf>bile 
stal!On is Jammed as 
3S 
pt.,.U ~ Pr(]ammed)xP,.Uam'llcG1) 
Pr (jam'IIed) x [Pa(jammed;' + p!.(jammed)x~=il (4 .8) 
" pr()ammed)xPf.(]ammedl • Pr(jallulled) . 
Now. Just as in the previous section, the power received from the jammer by the 
mobile stati on depends on the location of the mobile station and can be represented as 
(4 .%) 
when;; ::: 0 and 
(4 .9bJ 
when;; < 0 
As in the exam ple in the previous section, leI us assume the jammer IS at its 
optimum location and with a power, Pj "" 0.5 W ~nJ antenna gain , GJ = 0 dB. From 
Figure 3.3, we see that with P, ~ 0.5, the optimum location of the jammer, dEJ is 0.45 
The probability of detection, PJ..f/ and probability of false alarm, Pf~'ff wnh the 
thresho ld set at le-20 is shown in Figure 4.9 and 4.10 respectively 
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Proba[) il ~y 01 detect 'on 1m K= l e-20 
o -5000 
Figure 4 .9 PI(l! of pHlbabili ty of detection with P, '" 0 _5 
C omparing Figures 4.2 and 4 .9. we see thai th~ Jammer has red uced the probabili ty 
1'1' r1etectilln. The probability of detectio n near the orig in is higher since it is nean~r to the 
hase station and receives a stronger signal from the base station. However, the further t:-e 
mobile station is fwm the base station. the lower is the probabil ity of detect ion . T his is 
clue t(> the effect of the jammer. It is especially significant along lhe x axis \o"here the 
j"mmer is located , Th e- probability (If detection wi thin the j am ming ci rc l l~ is :rem since 
we- have assumed that the mobile station will lock-on to the jamming signal and hence 
will [lut detect the base station 'S signal 
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Probabi lrty oi fa lse a larm lor K_1oJ·20 
figu re 4.10 Plot of probability uf fal:>e alarm with P, == 0.5. 
Comparing figure 4.3 and 4.10. we see that the false alarm is no longer l.ero. This 
is because of the noise created by the jammer has a significant effect on the probabili ty 
of fahe alarm. Puints nearer to the jammer suffer a higher prohabil ity of falo,.e alarm. The 
pmbabi li ry of false alarm becomes smaller as we move further from the jammer. Thr 
probabil ity of fa lse alarm within the jamm ing circle is not defined since the mobile stmion 
wi ll I(,ck-on to the jamming signal 
Similar 10 the previous section, we take the mean probabilit ies by add ing the 
probabil ities for all points within the cell but outside the jamming circ le and then dividing 
it by the number of points. These mean probabilities are the mean conditional probability 
~'f (\~.teuion and the mean conditional probabili ty of false alarm given that thr mobile 
stari"n is not Jammer\. Using (4.7) and (4.8), and from Figure 3.7, the probabili ty of 
J"mrning fur P, = 0.5 is 0.21. we can calculate and plot the effeLlive probahil ity of 
dcte..:ti(HI and false alarm as shown in Figure 4.11 and 4. 12 respectively. 
Figure 4.11 PIO! of effective probabi lity of dtU;ction for different thrtshokls, P, = 0.5 
Fr,'m fi gule 4.J I, we see that tht max.imum P" II is only 0.79 whirh i~ the 
probability 01 tht mohile station not hting Jammtd . ThertfClre, thr, max.imum efft..:tive 
prohability Clf detection is 110 longer one as in the case withuut jamming. The jammer has 
in fact reductd the etfective prohability of dttection. 
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Plot 01 Probability 01 False Alarm vs T" r",shotrl 
Similarly. from r igure 4.12, WI.': see that the lower bound fur Flo,fj is 0.2 1 and this 
i, the probability of the mobile station being jam med as :>cen in (4 .8). This implies tha t 
irrespective of the threshold vaJue, the minimum effective probability of fa lse alarm due 
w the jammer is 0.21. The jammer has also increased the effective probahility of false 
al arm 
2 . Mean Acquisition Time 
Sim ilar to the case of no jamming as highlighted in the previous $<~ctjon . the mean 
;lcquisilion lime T. " where jamming is pre sent is related to p.,.!! anel PI.41 as 
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whnc L is the w tal number (If different phases in the I, Q PN seque ll~ e and T" is the 
~nalty time inclIrred for each false alarm. By assuming a pe nalty time of JO )( T I; and l 
= 3276S , we can plot the mean acquisition time llsing (4 .10) in figure 4. 13 
=------'----~-~-
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- - - - - - - - - -- :c-c;-c----;cc-;:-cc-~ 
Figure 4.13 Mean acqubition lime for different thresholds with P, ~ 0.5 & 1", "" 10To' 
Fw m Figun~ 4. 13. we find that the mean acquisition time at the th reshold of le-20 
is of the orde r of a t. housand se(;onds. This dearly is not acceptable fl'T all pra~tical 
purpusr.s. In other words, the Jammer has dfc<:tively jammed the pilot signal and 
prevented th~. mobile station from locking-on to the base station's signal 
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By enlarging Figure 4.13, we see from Figure 4 .1 4 that the minimum mean 
:iLljul,;iliu n time i, IIOW achieved at a thresh01d 1.2 e· ]9 and i~ afllund (:'3 s 
Plot of mean acqLJisition time vs threshold 
II 
68,5 - - --c:---7;c------cC-----cec-----', 
~ 10'"" 
Enlarged plO! of mean acquisit ion time for different thresholds with f' , == 0.5 
JOT. 
We will now examine the effect of varying the jamilling p0wer on the mean 
~clJui\iti ,>n time. The mean acquisition time for three different P, afe sh,lwil in Figure 
4., 5 
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Figure 4.15 Mean a(;ljuisition time vs thresholds with ct iffcfI:nt P" T, '" JOT . 
Figure 4.15 shows thaI the power of the jamma does have a significant effect on 
the mean acq uisi tion time. For example, an increase in P, from 0.1 to 0 .5 causes the mean 
aC4ui sition time 10 increase from 8.13 s to 63 s. 
Next, Ihe effect of varying the penally time. Tr on the mean acquisition ti me is 
studied. The mean acqui sition time for three different penalty times are shown in Figure 
4 .1 6 
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Plot of mtian acquisillon timti ~s thresholds 
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Figure 4.16 Mean acquisition time vs threshold with different Tp> f', == 0.5 
From Figure 4.16. it can be seen that the pe nalty time also has a significant effect 
un the mean acquisition time. A rloubling of penalty time, T. from lOT. to 20T., causes 




In this thesis, we have studied the effects of an intelligent jamming on a digital 
mobile cellular netwOJk similar to the one developed by Qua1comm Inc. The- Qualcomm 
mobile celJular network uses CDMA technology. It supports data ra tes from 1.2 kbps to 
9.0 kbps and has a processing gain of 21 dB to 30 d.B depending on the data rate. For 
sy nchronizati(lll, the base station transmits an unmodulatcd pilot signal with two short In-
phase, I and QuadraltJrc phase, Q PN sequences which all the mobile stations try to 
acquire' .. Once the pilot signal is acquired, the mobile station knows the exact phase of tile 
I and Q PN sequences uscd by the base station. It use-.S thi.~ informatiClD for coherent 
demodulation of subsequent data transmined from the base station 
The probability that a mobile statiN] within the cell is jammed was determined 
lly varying the poSition of the jammer within the cell, the probabi lity of Jamming varies 
As expected. our results indicate that the probability of jamming depends on the power 
of the jammer as well as the position of the jammer. The locus of optimum location s 
which give the maximum probahility of jamming for different powers is obtained . .In 
general, for maximum probability of Jamming, the higher the jamming power, the closer 
the jammer is to the base station. 
We have alS(] analyzed the effects of an intelligent jammer on the prohability of 
detection. the probability of false alarm and the mean acgu i.~i tion time fnr the mobile 
sration to acquire the pilot signal of the base station. An intelligent jammer is one which 
transmits on the same bandwidth as the base station's signal, with the same I'N sequence 
but at a diffe rent phase. By first ignoring the jamming signal, we derived the mobile 
~lation's threshold which minimizes the mean acquisition lime. We have found that the 
minimum acquisition time is around 1.7 s ..... hieh is very neilJ to the 2 s value claimed by 
QuaJcomm. With thi, tru-eshoid, we analyred the probability of detection, probability of 
false alarm and the mean acquisition lime in the presence of the Jamm ing signaL We 
have found il significant increase in the mean acquisition time under jamming. Fnr an 
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intelligent jammer which rransmits at 10% pOWer of the base station, the mean acquisition 
time is increased from 1.7 s to 8.13 $, a five-fold increase. Our resu lts indicate that it 
t.1kes only a relatively low-powered intellige rl tj ammer to render the network in-operative . 
The effects of the penalty time were also investigated. 
n. RECOMt\.lENDATIONS FOR FlJRTIIER RESEARCH 
1. Sensitivity of Mean Acquisition Time to Integl":Jtion Time 
In the thesis, we have seen the effects of false alarm penalty time on the mean 
al:quisition time. It would be of imerest to find OUi the effects of varying tlil;.': integration 
time on the ml;.':an acquisition time . 
2. Multipte Jammers 
The results obtained in this thesis can be extended to the case of multiple jammers 
within the cell. This of CalifSI.' will increase the probability of jamming and provide eVen 
greater degradation to the mobile cellular network. With a suit.1ble number of jammers, 
the power of rach jamml;.':r can be redul:ed, thereby making it more diffkult to locatl;.': the 
Jammers. We shou ld be able to find the optimum num ber of jammers with a certain power 
and thrir loca tions that will del iver the max imum degradation to the network. 
3. Muttipte Mobile Stations 
In this thesis . we have considered only a single mohile station within the ceIL Our 
rl;.':su its I:an bl;.': I;.':xtended to multiple mobile stations. By assuming the mobile statiuns are 
distributed independently, We can find the probability jamming multiple mobik stations 
usi ng the binom ial distribution. 
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APPENDIX A. PRO(;RAM S TO CAI.CULATE AND PLOT OPTlM1JM JAMMER 
1.0t:A T10N , CENTER OF JAI\'lMING CIRCLE, RADIUS OF JAMMING CiRCLE AND 
I'RonAIHLlTY OF JAMMING 
'h .................................. ....... . ... . .. .. .. ....... • •• H .................... % 
%PJOgram: probj .m 
%ALlL'1or: Eug~ne Chang 
" 
%L"l Updale: 4 Nov '14 
" 





S'( ...... u ............... • • •••••• •• .. • •• • .. •• .. •• .. • .. •• .... • •• .. • ..................... % 
1.= 1; 
l=t+ l : 
,"d 
sav~ probj 
%Nurmal,zed radiUS ofrell 
'hJammer,hslallce Rj 




%~ •••••••••••••••••••••• ,~~.~ •••••••••••• ~*~. , •• ~ ••• -••••••••• - •••••• - •• - . .... . . ..... % 
% 
%PlolS the optinllun januner location with d,fferent jalluuing power 
%Autnor: Eugeoe Chang 
IJpJate: 24 O~, 94 
%.- •• -.-. - ••••••••••••• --.-••••• - ••••• - •• *. ~ •• • - ••• ~ •••••••••••••••• - ••• ••• • - ••.••••• "'" 
%P10IS the Optimum jalluner locat ioll ~s different januning power 
%._ • • • • # •• •••• " •••• u ............................................................... % 
V;,P IU1' lIw C¢nT~ r of opl imum jamming circle vs Pt 
% __ ................................................ h ........... ..... . .............. ''Yo 
v5 Pt') 
c",Plo t ~ th~ ,"dlLlS of opt imtun j~mming circle vs Pt 
% • •• ••• • u .......... __ ..... . .......... .... os •• • ••••••• ••• •••••••••••• _ ................ % 
%Plot~ the Probability of jamming vs different PI 
% •• _ ... u ........................................................ H.",,*.H ....... u,*% 
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Af>f>E~DIX B. rROGRAl'tIS TO CA LCUL I\TE AND PLOT rROBABIUTY OF 
DETECTION , PROBABILITY <H" FALSE ALARM AND MEAN ACQUISITION TIME 
WITHOUT JAMMING 
% ....................................... . ..... H •••••••••••• H ...... . .......... U • •• • % 
%Progr.1m ; pdO.m % 
% 
%Calcu]ates probab il ity of deleClion and false aiann with no januning % 
% % 
%AuLhor: Eugene Chang % 
% 
%L~~I Upda t ~: 18 Nov 9~ % 
, % 
'Yo ' ................................................................................... % 
PB= I; 
r", K=U;~~ · 22 :l e · 19 
j=ol ; 
"Wilber _oC sample,=O; 
Pd_y _x =[]; 
I'f:,_y-xz[) ; 
sigma2= NO/4'T: 
%Powcr of base = I W 
%Gain of base '"' I 
o/q{jam of mobile '" 1 
%Radiusofcell 




;"'.1 + 1: 
end 
saye pd O 
"" ....................................................... - •• -- •• - ••••••••••••••• - ••••• % 
%ProgIJm: p,o:jO,m 
'X 
pr()babdi;y ()f del eCl i()n and false a larm wilhoUl jamrmng 
Eugene Ciw,ng 
Updak: 16 Noy ')4 
'X 
% •••••••••• -.- •••• -.-•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - ••• • •••• ••• - ••••••• •••••••• <t 
'~, •. _ •• _._* •••••••••. _ •.. H •••••• HH ••• _ •• h •• ** •• H ••• _ ••••••••••••••••••••• _ ••••••• "" 
lacqO.nJ 
'~,Pl ()l ' lh~ m~"" ~C"u i SIl'()n lime wi!ho,,1 jamming 
" %/\uthm: E"g~ll~ Chang 
'X 




APPENDIX. C PROGRAMS TO CALCULATE AND PLOT PRORAJIn.lTY OF 
DETECTIO N, I'ROTlABUHY OF FALSE A LARM ANn MEAN A(;QU ISITI(JN TIME 
WITH J AM MING 
%n~~~~~'~""'B" """"" "" """"""" " *** """'''' ....................... % 
%Pfogram: pd l .m 
%C:li~ublts ~robbJl i ly of de!eCIIOn and false alarm ..... itll iammcr 
% 
Eugene Chang 
l 'pdale; 17 N,w 'l4 
% • •••••••••••••••••••• ••• ••••• • n ....... '~'" ••• ~ •••••••••••••••• ~ t o_ ••••••••• _ • • _. _ '% 
PB~ l: 
I'J=05; 
GB= l ; 
GJ~l 
GM=l : 
Rj = ().44~U-'c 





i f x). [) 
!ng l ~ =at:lI\(y/x ) 







%Prog.ram : plc\j ~Jl 
% 
%P1Q IS (he prQb~bi1:ly of deTection and false alarm 
% 
%ALl thor : Eugene Chan~ 
% 
'loLa,! Updale: 1~ Nov 94 
'k 
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%' . . . . . ..... . .. .............. ... .... .... ... . ...... ... . . .. .. ......... . .. . ... .. .. . ..... % 
%Pm);ra.m: [""<j.W 
<, 
%P)Ol' ti1~ m~~n acquisn;uJl li me 
<, 
% Author: Eug~"e Chang 
%Las\ Update: 1 S Nov 94 
% 
% 
% .. . .... . . ......... . ...... . .......... . ....... . ........ H ... . .... _ . . . .. ... . . .. .. ...... % 
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AI'PEND IX D. MISCELLANEOUS PROC.RAJ\1S 
,~ . . . . ....... .............. . .............. . ..... .. .................................... % 
,* Program:rnc,h_plutJn 
% % 
%Plmsthe probability of det ection and falst" alarm % 
% 
%Authu r: Eugelle C hang 
% 




"' .......................................... ..................... .. .............. ..... ~ 
1'~"r~ll ) 
m~.'h(. _ r:.Jl!:~ .y_'al\g~.Pd_y_x ·) :J;nd 
colmmap([O0 O]J 
tll k( ·Pr0babLilly ofde leC lwn for K=ole ·20·) 
x lab~l ("x ") 
ylabel (Y·) 
z labdCProbab,lilyQfdetecllOn "j 
ax,s([-rcfCO rc0 l j) 
figme(2) 
mesh(x_,:tnge.YJangej'fa_y_x):grid 
cu l<)nnap([OO 0]) 
1II 1~("Pruba billly uf fa lse alarm for K= 1~-2U·) 
ylahclCy") 
ll:t ~eI ("Pr 0babil lly orfal~ alJ.fln ·) 
.m s([ -rc rcOrcOl ]) 





'k Aul ho r: Eugene Chang 
~ % 
'~ L;,,' Updal~: 12 Nov <,14 % 
<. % % .............. ....... . ............. . ................. . ..... ... ..................... . % 
fUIlCllon y=pdf(u.lamda_ l.Slgma2) 
for k=I:leIlSlh(u) 





a(k)=l Jsqr1 (S ' pl'sigma2 ' sqrt (u(k)'lamdn_l )); 
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